Alexander successfully mastered the program, but could not avoid the military "drill" of that time.

Alexander successfully mastered the program, but could not avoid the military "drill" of that time.

The order of peasant reform required an agreement between the landlord and the peasant on the size of the allotment, as well as on the obligations of the peasant in relation to the landlord.

This should have been stated in the "charter" within one year of dismissal.

If the abolition of serfdom took place immediately, the elimination of feudal, economic relations, which had lasted for decades, lasted for many years. According to the law, for another two years the peasants were obliged to perform the same duties as in serfdom.

The serfdom decreased only slightly, and small extortions were abolished. Prior to the transfer of the peasants for ransom, they were in a temporarily secured position, ie obliged to perform the serfdom or pay dues for the allotments given to them in accordance with the norms established by law. Since there was no specific period after which the temporarily secured peasants had to be transferred to compulsory ransom, their release was extended for 20 years (although by 1881 they remained no more than 15%).

Despite the predatory nature of the reform of 1861 for the peasants, its significance for the further development of the country was very great. This reform was a turning point in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The liberation of the peasants contributed to the intensive growth of the labor force, and the granting of certain civil rights to them contributed to the development of entrepreneurship. The reform provided the landlords with a gradual transition from feudal to capitalist forms of economy.

05/11/2012

Alexander II as Emperor of Russia. Abstract

The abstract provides information about the identity of Emperor Alexander Nikolaevich in the topics for personal narratives first years of his reign

The son of Prince Nikolai Pavlovich Alexander, born in 1818, from the earliest days of his life revered as a future monarch, because neither Emperor Alexander I nor Tsarevich Constantine had sons, and in his generation he was a senior prince. Accordingly, his education and upbringing was well placed, and aimed at preparing him for a high mission.

Alexander II’s first tutor was Captain Murder, and at the age of nine VA Zhukovskaya began his studies. The program on which the future emperor studied was carefully worked out and aimed at making him a man educated and well-informed, keeping him from premature fascination with the details of military affairs. Alexander successfully mastered the program, but could not avoid the military "drill" of that time.

At the age of twenty-three, Tsarevich married Maria Alexandrovna, Princess of Hesse-Darmstadt. Since then, Alexander began his career. For ten years he was the right hand of his father. Judging by the testimony of historians, Alexander II was strongly influenced by his father, and adopted some of his qualities. However, he was distinguished from the iron character of Nicholas innate softness and generosity. That is why Alexander’s personality cannot be assessed unambiguously – at different moments of his life he makes different impressions.

The first years of his reign, the emperor tried to eliminate the effects of the Eastern War and the order of Nikolaev time. Regarding foreign policy, Alexander appeared to be continuing the "beginning of the Holy Alliance" of political leaders and Alexander I and Nicholas I. In addition, at the first reception of the diplomatic corps, the emperor said he was ready to continue the war if he does not achieve an honorable peace.

In this way, he demonstrated to Europe that, in this respect, he is continuing his father’s policy. Also in domestic politics, people had the impression that the new emperor would continue his father’s business. In practice, however, this was not the case: "the softness and tolerance characteristic of the new monarch’s temperament were blown away. Minor difficulties were removed from the press; universities breathed more freely …" free voice. "In fact, it was so, because, taught by the bitter experience of powerlessness in the Crimean War, Alexander demanded a" frank account of all the shortcomings. "

Some historians believe that at first the program did not exist at all, because the difficulties of wartime did not allow him to focus on the internal order of the country. Only after the end of the war in a manifesto of March 19, 1856, Alexander II said his famous phrase, which became the slogan for Russia for many years: "Thus affirms and improves internal order; truth and mercy and reigns in the courts; so develops everywhere and with renewed vigor. to education and all useful activities … "

05/11/2012

"Perestroika" in the USSR: essence and consequences. Abstract

Exacerbation of the systemic crisis of Soviet totalitarianism and attempts to reform it in the second half of the 1980s. Exacerbation of the socio-economic situation in Ukraine. Changes in public life. The struggle of national democratic forces for Ukraine’s independence

The purpose of this abstract is to summarize the material on the topic. The topic covers the last phase of the systemic crisis of Soviet totalitarianism, which began in the mid-80’s, it manifested itself in both socio-political and socio-economic spheres and is of great importance in the formation of an independent state of Ukraine.

Exacerbation of the systemic crisis of Soviet totalitarianism and attempts to reform it in the second half of the 1980s

Perestroika is a term that came into widespread use in the mid-1980s. political pluralism, the end of the Cold War, etc.). p.

In February 1986, the XXVII Congress of the CPSU adopted a new version of the Party Program, from which the task of building communism was removed, proclaiming a course for the improvement of socialism. It was then that Gorbachev put forward two fundamentally new political slogans – openness and broad democracy. In other words, it was decided to start the reforms not with the economic basis, but with the political superstructure.

The main achievements of the policy of publicity were: the elimination of "white spots" in the history of the USSR; return from oblivion of the names of many political and cultural figures discredited in the 1930s and 1970s, banned literary works, films, scientific and journalistic works; easing censorship; developing discussions around key issues of social, political and spiritual development; breaking old propaganda stereotypes and ideological myths; the emergence of ideological pluralism, diversity of opinion; the fall of the Iron Curtain and the possibility of dialogue with Western countries; improving Soviet-American relations.

Sharp journalistic works appeared on the pages of such publications as "Moscow News", "Light", "New World", "Flag", "October", "Questions of History", "Literary Ukraine", "October", etc. People were surprised to learn about previously hidden from them are facts of the past related to the revolution and the Civil War of 1917–1920, the nepom, the policy of collectivization and industrialization, the Holodomor, Stalinist repressions of the 1930s, the Great Patriotic War, the "Khrushchev thaw" of dissidents, and Brezhnev’s stagnation. ".

In 1986 alone, newspapers and magazines acquired 14 million new readers. Naturally, the policy of publicity caused a sharp politicization of citizens and the growth of ideological polarization. Discussions on the pages of print media, on radio and television were dominated not by scientific arguments, but by emotions and ideological passions. At the same time, the communist ideology began to be openly attacked by its opponents, and a period of "disarray and hesitation" began in the party itself. Pluralism of opinion contradicted the existing totalitarian system, and the need for radical political reform arose.

Gorbachev’s trouble is that he failed to find an adequate concept of the transition from totalitarianism to democracy. The English researcher Archie Brown writes: in the form in which the Soviet Union existed before the beginning of perestroika, it could continue to function only in a totalitarian regime. Since the totalitarian system by its nature cannot be reformed, the transition of Soviet society to democracy was undoubtedly to lead to the disintegration of the last "empire."

Announcing the introduction of democratic principles and norms in early 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev tried to weaken them after 1988, when Soviet society really began to democratize. That is, the main problem of Mikhail Gorbachev on the way to the implementation of the theoretical course of perestroika in the practice of Soviet life was the unwillingness to implement the declared principles of democratization and publicity in full. They were limited by the growth of his monopoly on power. Evidence of this is his election to the following positions (each of which he held without resigning the previous one): Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Verkhovna Rada (October 1, 1988), Chairman of the USSR Verkhovna Rada (June 9, 1989 ), President of the USSR (March 14, 1990).

At the same time, this does not mean that Gorbachev wanted to become an authoritarian ruler (dictator), because the principles of government inherent in the authoritarian regime were not implemented. After all, dictators who come to power do not start with democratic reforms, that is, attempts to legally limit their hitherto unlimited power. Mikhail Gorbachev proved twice that he did not seek authoritarianism: the first time he set out to democratize the USSR, and the second time he gave up power when he noticed that society wanted a different government, and that this really existed and could be effective.

It is fair to say that the main problem of perestroika was the party, the CPSU. The expectation that it would become the vanguard of perestroika did not materialize. Her ability to "self-reform" proved to be an illusion. It turned out quite early. Therefore, in January 1987, a plenum of the Central Committee was held on personnel issues, and in February of the following year – a plenum on ideology. As the democratization of society and publicity deprived the CPSU of state functions, it turned into opposition to perestroika and then became its direct enemy.