In the second half of 1919, the authoritarian rule of S. was actually introduced.

In the second half of 1919, the authoritarian rule of S. was actually introduced.

Meanwhile, society during the struggle against the hetman became increasingly militarized. Active activists of the uprising, people’s leaders, who had not previously played a significant political role, emerged as a competing elite group of atamans, figures who "made themselves." The military continued to rush to power in alliance with the independents, in particular P. Bolbachan and V. Oskilko. The power of the military increased considerably after S. Petliura, the chief ataman, the first man in the army, became a member of the Directory.

The relationship between the political elite of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the hetmanate has been little studied, although the activities of the Ukrainian government in 1917-1920, which evolved into a paramilitary dictatorship, are of considerable interest. Individuals (mostly very subjectiveand intelligence) have appeared only recently [see, eg: 9; ten; eleven].

In 1917 a peculiar phenomenon of Ukrainian officers developed. The generals and senior officers who were called to serve the UPR were socially alien to the revolutionaries from the USSR and the USDRP, the leaders of the Central Rada. In terms of social status, age, life experience, attitude to the Ukrainian language and culture, these were completely different worlds. As a result, part of this general in 1919 turned to the White Guards. It is also significant that during the hetman’s coup no general or officer brought his soldiers to the defense of the Central Rada. The vast majority of them went to serve in the hetman’s army without any problems, and later just as easily turned to the hetman’s enemy – the Directory of the UPR.

Such a composition of senior officers could not but disturb the government – it constantly felt the danger of a "coup d’etat." Because of this, the Central Rada delayed the development of the armed forces of Ukraine, placing the matter under the care of party figures – S. Petliura and M. Porsche. And this deepened the gap between the party and military elites.

The deepest conflict over military power occurred in late 1917 between the Minister of War S. Petliura, who was looking for contacts with officers and generals, and the Secretary General, the second man in the UPR – V. Vynnychenko. S. Petliura, although he was a "party member", relied in his ministry on specialists – General O. Grekov, Lieutenant Colonels Yu. Kapkin and V. Pavlenko. V. Vynnychenko then denied the need for a full-fledged armed forces, he recognized only police forces. At the end of 1917, the Social Democratic faction recalled S. Petliura from the government and replaced him with a "party member" from the USDRP, M. Porsche. According to the party members, the danger of S. Petliura seizing power in alliance with the military was eliminated.

From the end of 1918 a new, "Otaman" elite began to form. It manifested itself in four forms: the elite formed in cooperation with S. Petliura, the Sich Riflemen, the officers of the UPR army, and the elite of the "right" officers. An example of Otaman ideas can be considered the activity of Makhnovists in the spirit of anarchism (N. Makhno’s power can be seen as a form of delegative democracy – a kind of regime where the institution of power does not ensure the rights of citizens but the interests of a leader who is not controlled by anyone.).

The overthrow of the Hetman regime and the establishment of the Directory did not stop the civil war. Continuous hostilities caused frequent relocations and perturbations in the government. Due to the complexity of the military-political situation, local self-government (village councils, city councils, labor councils) did not function everywhere. In the second half of 1919, the authoritarian rule of S. Petliura and individual military atamans was actually introduced.

The threat of full occupation of Ukraine forced the chief ataman to seek an agreement with Poland, which led to a break with the government of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic. The UPR leadership soon lost control of the territory and was forced to emigrate. The nationwide anti-Bolshevik uprising expected by S. Petliura never broke out.

The ways of Ukrainians to the revival of national statehood turned out to be steep and thorny. Unfortunately, at that time some political currents did not merge into a single state stream. The defeat of the liberation struggle was also caused by the destructuring of society and the weakness of the social base of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. All this led to a national catastrophe – the liquidation of Ukraine’s short-lived independence.

Thus, the formation of the Ukrainian political elite in the late 1910s had features that did not contribute to the creation of a true national elite capable of leading and continuing the process of liberation struggle to strengthen the independent Ukrainian state.

Some features of that ancient process are inherent in the modern stage of development of our state. We emphasize that history not only happens but also happens. And incomparably more is happening than is happening. As K. Popper emphasized in "Open Society and Its Enemies," although "history is devoid of purpose, we can impose our goals on it, and although history is devoid of meaning, we can give it meaning … Neither nature nor history can say what we should do.

Facts, whether facts of nature or history, cannot make decisions for us, cannot determine the goals we should choose … "[12]. It has become an axiom to say that it is the political elite, as the decisive force of historical and social -political process, determines the purpose and meaning of these processes and is therefore responsible for their direction, effectiveness and consequences.


Fedenko P. Vlad Skoropadsky. – London-Munich, 1968. – P. 5. Verstyuk V. Ukraine of the Central Age. – K.: Testament, 1997. – P. 248. Lysyak-Rudnytsky I. Between history and politics. – Munich, 1973. – P. 134 – 145, Shapoval M. Hetmanate and Directory // Fatherland. – 1995. – № 11 – 12. – P. 135.Doroshenko D. History of Ukraine. 1917 – 1923 Hetmanate. – New York: Mace, 1954. – Vol. 2. – P. 99. Shapoval M. Hetmanate and Directory // Fatherland. – 1996. – No. 1 – 2. – P. 135 – 137; 1995. – No. 11 – 12. – P. 135 – 138. Hass L. Wolnomularstwo ukrainske. 1917-1921 // Studia z dzejow ZSRR i Europy Srodkowej. – 1983. – T. 18. – S. 57 – 62. Lypinsky V. Letters to the brothers-farmers. – Vienna: Will, 1922. – P. 32. Tynchenko J. Ukrainian officers: ways of grief and oblivion 1917 – 1921. – Kyiv, 1995. Kolyanchuk O., Lytvyn O., Naumenko K. Generality of Ukrainian liberation struggles. – Lviv, 1995. Shtender J. Sentenced to execution. – Lviv, 1995. Popper K. Open society and its enemies. – K., 1994. – V 2 t. T. 2. – S. 302.


Problems of formation of the Ukrainian political nation. Abstract

Despite the positive dynamics of value orientations of the population of Ukraine, the mass consciousness of its citizens remains contradictory and ambivalent. Therefore, at the current stage of development of Ukrainian society, the only possible principle of functioning and development of the Ukrainian political nation may not be the essential principle of nation-building, although the formula for dynamic development of a modern political nation is an organic combination of perfect mechanisms of ethnocultural reproduction and solving political and socio-economic problems.

The Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada "On the Internal and External Situation of Ukraine in 2002" outlines one of the most important tasks of the new stage of state development as creating conditions for real and national interests-oriented consolidation of Ukrainian society and development of the Ukrainian political nation. Based on the fact that today every fourth citizen of Ukraine by origin belongs to a national minority, uniting all citizens into a single political nation is an urgent task.

The name "Ukrainian nation", according to Yu. Lypa, was first used during the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky [1]. It was thanks to the hetman’s victories in the national liberation war of 1648-1654, and even earlier – the existence of the Zaporozhian Sich, that Ukrainian cultural identity became a recognized and important factor in the political history of Europe. However, the treaty with Russia concluded in 1654 in Pereyaslav slowed down the self-determination of the Ukrainian people for a long time. The Andrusiv Accords of 1667, which Moscow concluded with Warsaw, divided the Ukrainian lands between Poland and Muscovy: the Right Bank passed to the Commonwealth, and the Left Bank with Kyiv to the Moscow Empire.

Since then, Ukrainian identity has existed mainly as a way of life for the "lower" sections of the population – its language, customs, rituals, etc. – sometimes taking on more reflective forms: slogans and demands of national liberation movements, masterpieces of spiritual creativity of its best representatives. iconic figures are Lesya Ukrainka and Taras Shevchenko. In general, Ukrainians in this period are formed in the paradigm of the so-called "ethnic nation".

Revolutionary processes in February and October 1917 destroyed the monarchy and the Russian Empire. Ukraine faced the prospect of forming its own political nation. The first step, in the wake of the revolutionary events in Kyiv in 1917, was the formation of the Central Rada, a representative body of the general population. The Central Rada proclaimed the autonomy of Ukraine and established the Ukrainian People’s Republic. And on January 22, 1918, the independence of the state was proclaimed.

The victory of the Bolsheviks in the civil war determined the formation of all spheres of public life in Ukraine (as in other republics of the former USSR) according what is the website that writes lab reports for you to the casuistry formula: "Socialist in content and national in form." It seems that there can be a form without content, and content without form. At the same time, Ukraine became a clearly defined national and territorial entity with its own capital (in 1919-1934, Kharkiv; from 1934, Kyiv) and a government with limited but definite powers. Ukraine had bodies of state power and administration, budget, State Emblem, Flag, Anthem, Constitution. Dozens of countries recognized the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1921). Subsequently, after the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on December 30, 1922, these achievements became purely formal.

During the restoration of the industry destroyed by the First World and Civil Wars, hundreds of factories and mills were built in Ukraine, which brought it to the level of developed industrial countries. At the same time, the 1930s were the most tragic in the history of Soviet Ukraine. The destruction of the national elite, the forcible collectivization of the countryside, the mass resettlement of the so-called kulaks, and the provoked famine of 1932-1933 not only significantly hampered the formation of Ukrainians’ sociocultural kinship, but also dealt a devastating blow to the nation’s gene pool.